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The theme of this conference is “the future of law school”.    That future depends on the 
future of many other things that are largely beyond  anyone’s control,  especially the 
way in which developments in political economy, technology, demography and society 
affect the legal system, the market for professional services and the structure of higher 
education.   But one crucial factor  is very much within  the control of law school:  the 
values they embrace and they way they define their  ambitions.  How they do so  will 
determine whether  law schools  collaborate with or resist, succumb to or transcend, the 
powerful forces that I have mentioned. It will determine whom they  hire as faculty 
members and admit as students, what and how they  teach,  the standards they  use to  
measure  achievements and the way they  allocate their  scarce resources.   And 
crucially,  it will determine how —— if at all — law schools  exploit their strategic 
location as producers and distributors, as conservators and critics, of legal and social 
knowledge.  
I’m going to present three quite different  views of what law schools ought to be and 
ought to do.  The first holds that their primary, if not their sole, function  should be to 
produce “practice-ready lawyers” for today’s profession.   The second is that they 
should  produce “tomorrow’s lawyers”, lawyers with the capacity to adapt to the rapidly 
and radically changing circumstances of legal practice.   And the third is that law 
schools should play a leading role in the creation and transformation of  legal 
knowledge, legal practice, and the legal system — a role that requires them to provide 
their students with a large and liberal understanding of law that will  prepare them for a 
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variety of legal and non-legal careers.   I’ll end by making a prediction about which 
model represents the future of law school.   Or perhaps you’ve guessed already.   
 
Training today’s lawyers 
 
I’ll begin with the widely-held view that it’s the job of law schools to produce practice-
ready lawyers.   This view is particularly important in light of recent  action by  Canada’s 
law societies to require law schools to ensure that their students possess knowledge of 
certain fields and acquire certain “competencies” to ensure they’re ready to practice.  
Unfortunately,  producing practice-ready lawyers is something  law schools can’t do.  
The problem is that no  one knows what  practice-ready lawyers   look like. We lack 
information about what legal practitioners do,  what  knowledge or competencies they 
actually need or use,  what breadth  and depth of knowledge qualify new graduates as 
“ready”  to practice, or  how long they will remain “ready” before what they learned at 
law school becomes  obsolete.   These are empirical questions.  However,  they were 
neither asked nor answered  before the law societies adopted their new regulations.    
 
That said, we are virtually certain of  one fact  about the profession: it is  fractured along 
a number of deep fault lines.  Those lines run vertically and divide general practitioners 
from specialists, specialists from each other,  and both from the remaining one-third  of  
law graduates who are employed outside  the private practice  of law, in government 
agencies, clinics or corporate law departments or  in non-legal capacities in business, 
the media or politics.  No less importantly, in private practice the fault lines run 
horizontally as well as vertically: the  profession is stratified.  As one descends from 
higher to lower strata, the clientele tends to becomes less affluent,  the work  less 
complex and more routine, and the rewards more meagre.   For these reasons, as  one 
traverses the grid formed by these intersecting vertical and horizontal  fault lines it is 
almost certain that the scope and depth  of  what lawyers need to know changes as 
well.   
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If I’m right,  if what lawyers need to know in order to be practice-ready varies 
considerably from one kind of practice to another, we arrive at an important conclusion:  
one size of legal education will not fit  all law graduates.  But quite inexplicably, 
Canada’s  law societies  believe  that it will.  They have recently decreed that all law 
schools must  ensure that all  students acquire all  “competencies”  and knowledge of all  
the substantive subjects or fields specified in their new regulations.  For that matter,  law 
societies assume that not only all new graduates but all established practitioners know 
the same things.  That’s why they allow them to undertake all kinds  of  work  that 
clients may entrust to them —murder trials or IPOs,  divorces or patent applications.  
That’s why they don’t  re-test lawyers to ensure they’ve kept their law school learning  
up-to-date; why they don’t give them qualified licenses that allow them to practice in 
some fields and not others; and why they don’t — except in rare circumstances —  
discipline lawyers  for  incompetence or ignorance.   To reiterate,  the official position 
seems to be that since all lawyers are presumed to be omni-competent, they must  all  
be  trained in the same way so as to  ensure that they  possess  a common core of 
knowledge for at least one brief moment in their careers.  This  position totally ignores 
the effects of specialization  and stratification —  two forces that most powerfully  
determine what lawyers need to know in order to  practice  competently.   If this position 
prevails,  if the recent law society regulations remain in force, whatever else law schools 
do, they will never be able to produce practice-ready lawyers. 
Training tomorrow’s lawyers 
And  law societies have ignored something else too:  the relentless  change that is 
destabilizing existing legal institutions,  rules,  processes and  patterns of practice.  By 
contrast,  the Canadian Bar Association  in its  recent Legal Futures  discussion paper   
identifies the drivers of legal change: technology,  politics, economics and demography.
We know that family structures,  business practices, regulatory technology,  forms of 
property,  patterns of social deviance, strategies  of social control: all of these are in 
flux.   Consequently,  statutes are amended,  common law rules mutate,  and legal 
routines and boilerplate change more frequently and drastically than they used to.   The 
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implications for legal education are important.  As  the CBA’s discussion paper notes, 
“with the speed of change taking place in the legal environment, choices made at the 
beginning of a student’s course of study may be outdated by the time he or she 
completes all of the necessary requirements for practice”  — requirements, I might 
remind you, that were set in stone by  Canada’s law societies.   I’ll  walk you through a 
few obvious examples.    
 
Over  three or four decades,  globalization has transformed  the production of goods 
and services, corporate structures, the international division of labour, the dissemination 
of intellectual property and finance capital  and — as a consequence — the norms, 
modalities and location of  many regimes of corporate governance and regulation.  In 
doing so, globalization has also dramatically altered the market for legal services, the   
structure of the law and consulting firms that deliver those services, the knowledge base 
of lawyers who advise global businesses,  the content of law school curricula and the 
focus of legal scholarship.     
 
Technology next.  Technology has not only enabled globalization.  It has had a direct 
effect on legal practice.   Some examples:  By facilitating the digitization, outsourcing or 
offshoring of routine “back-of-house” functions,  technology has allowed large law firms 
to reduce their complement of articling students and junior associates which, in turn, 
has destabilized  their business model.  By disseminating legal information online,  
technology has allowed retail purchasers of standard legal services to access self-help 
sites and permitted online  service  providers to undercut the lower-tier law firms that 
formerly depended on such services for  their core business.  And by  enabling 
electronic searches,  technology has not only made legal research faster and cheaper;  
it has  blurred the boundaries amongst legal categories and between law and adjacent 
disciplines. In effect,  technology has expanded law’s territorial reach and intellectual 
horizons while shrinking its market share.     
 
Now a brief word about demography.  Like the rest of the Canadian workforce,  the legal 
profession is not only aging.  It is attracting more and more women and growing more 
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and more ethnically diverse.   These developments have had important implications for 
the deployment, financial fortunes,  governance and education of lawyers.  Some 
illustrations:  diversity has forced large law firms to embrace meritocracy as a 
recruitment policy, undermined the image of law as a “gentleman’s profession”, and  
generated pressures for greater democracy in the profession’s governing bodies.  
Meritocracy  has also —ironically —converted  law schools into gatekeepers, whose  
badges of “merit” largely decide which graduates  will, and which  will not, gain access 
to the most coveted opportunities the profession has to offer.  But  meritocracy has not 
completely won the day.  Discrimination and prejudice persist.  Many highly qualified 
women feel obliged to leave  elite firms for jobs in government and  corporate law 
departments where they find the work environment more supportive.   And students 
from immigrant and racialized minority groups — who often confront economic,  
linguistic and social barriers before, during and after  law school —  tend to cluster in 
disproportionate numbers  in  lower-tier solo practices or small firms.   These new   
patterns of recruitment and practice have undermined the bar’s traditional reliance  on  
informal  socialization as a strategy for instilling  professional values in its members.  
Perhaps this explains why  law societies have recently decreed that law schools must 
instruct their students in “professionalism”— a  project that the profession itself is no 
longer willing or able to  undertake,  underwrite or even define.     
 
I have tried to  show how  political economy,  technology and demography have 
become drivers of change not only in legal rules and institutions, but in legal practice 
and ultimately legal education.   However,  to reiterate, the  profession’s governing 
bodies  have ignored the challenge of  educating lawyers for an uncertain future just as  
resolutely as they have ignored the need for hard evidence about how  lawyers actually 
practice in a multi-dimensional present.  One thing is certain:  making graduating 
students  tick all the boxes on  an arbitrary list of  “competencies” and  fields of 
substantive  law is no way to ensure that they will  be “practice ready” today,  much less  




The CBA’s discussion paper — which is very future-oriented — somewhat  tentatively 
suggests that  “[l]aw faculties should continue to play an important role in teaching the 
theory of law, legal principles and legal reasoning.” It then adds:  “While some 
observers would have them place increased emphasis on the practice of law, law 
schools in their current form may not be the best option for providing practice training.”   
This suggestion  that law schools should focus  on  “theory…, principles… and 
reasoning”, this  scepticism about their role in “practice training”, is in part  intended to 
ensure that law graduates have the intellectual tools they need to adapt to the changing 
but unpredictable requirements of legal and other careers.  But in  part it represents a 
strong hint  that  law schools should focus on what they  do best.   
 
Transforming legal knowledge, legal practice and the legal system.   
 
What do they do best?  Law schools  are knowledge communities:  they exist to collect, 
critique, produce and disseminate knowledge.  We therefore need  briefly to consider 
what we mean by knowledge in the context of law.   Obviously the profession is (or 
should be) as concerned about knowledge as the academy.  After all,  its monopoly 
over legal practice rests on the claim that lawyers know things that other people don’t.  
However,  the profession  and the academy  relate to  “knowledge” differently.   
Practitioners  tend to consume knowledge, academics  to produce it.  Practitioners tend 
to know what they need to know, academics to know what they want to know.   
Practitioners tend to treat knowledge as a given; academics   to treat it as  contingent, 
as being constantly revised by new evidence, new methodologies, new theories, new  
ways of knowing.  Practitioners and academics both need to master non-legal  domains 
of knowledge, but many practitioners are  reluctant to admit this, while most academics 
celebrate inter-disciplinarity.   And finally, practitioners especially value tacit knowledge, 
practical knowledge that is gained through experience,  disseminated through 
mentorship and deployed in response to trained reflex;  academics prize  explicit 




It’s easy to see, then, that  disagreements between the  academy and the profession  
about the nature of knowledge are at the root of disagreements over who should control 
law schools —  the profession’s governing bodies or the universities and their  law  
faculties.   The future of law schools, I argue — and the future of law as a profession, 
social institution and intellectual discipline — depends on who  controls knowledge.  
Law schools cannot  function well as knowledge communities if  their view of knowledge 
is disparaged, marginalized or suppressed because it conflicts with that of the 
profession; if legal orthodoxy has  a privileged place on the curriculum and a pre-
emptive claim on  resources;  if  critical scholarship and transformative pedagogy are  
seen as illicit  attempts to subvert professionalism;  if  research,  graduate studies and 
public advocacy come to be seen as  derogating from the “true” or “core”  mission of law 
schools or as mere decorative appendages to it.   
 
To return to the main thrust of my argument:  if the academy must  be  free to collect, 
critique, produce and disseminate knowledge as it thinks best, how should it use that 
freedom?    In two ways:   First,  in a world that’s in flux, in a legal universe that is 
increasingly chaotic,  it’s the academy’s job to make sense of it all.   The academy 
should therefore chronicle change,  identify continuities and discontinuities,   
demonstrate  causes and effects and explain  whose interests and which  values are  
being advanced or attacked.  The academy should advocate for change intelligently 
when it deserves support and fiercely resist it when it doesn’t.  And the academy   
should  wrestle with change:  it should propose new statutes, conjure up new doctrines 
and invent new instruments of private governance.   And now my second response.  In 
its engagement with change,  the academy must not only think about,  write about and 
wrestle with change.   It  must  equip  future legal architects  and  legal artisans with the 
tools to enable them cope with change.   And finally, as  the CBA discussion paper 
makes clear,  change  requires  that legal scholars and students,  legal practitioners and 
policy makers,  venture into  new domains of theoretical and practical knowledge.  
Academics in adjacent disciplines,  experts in  government agencies and private 
consultancies, leaders in business and social movements all have a great deal to tell us.   
To engage these “relevant others” in meaningful conversations, we  must  learn talk to  
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them in their own vernacular.  This is perhaps our greatest challenge: to learn to 
integrate law-talk with other discourses. 
 
Putting change at the centre of what they do will be hard for law schools — especially 
with regard to their lawyer-training functions.   However,  they have already made a 
good start.   
 
First,  law schools have generally  abandoned  the notion that legal education is only 
about  teaching legal rules.   Instead law schools generally aim to train students to “think 
like lawyers” — to develop generic analytical and critical skills that  can be deployed 
over time and across a wide variety of  legal and non-legal contexts.   This is certainly 
better than insisting — as law societies perversely do — that all lawyers must know the 
same things.  But the current strategy is  still somewhat problematic.  Perhaps, like 
pornography, we can recognize “law-think” when we see it.   However, there is  little 
empirical evidence that all lawyers think alike, that they analyse legal problems in 
similar fashion, that “law-think”  occupies a significant part of their working days,  or that 
lawyers think differently from, say, social workers,  literary critics or corporate 
executives.  Indeed within legal-academic circles, there is a robust debate about what it 
means to “think like a lawyer”.  One  distinguished legal scholar has recently  argued 
that  “[t]hinking like a lawyer is thinking like a human being, a human being who is 
tolerant, sophisticated, pragmatic, and engaged.”   On the other hand,  there’s an 
extensive literature that argues to  the contrary, that “thinking like a lawyer”  involves a 
distinctive repertoire of analytical and discursive strategies.  But whichever position one 
favours,  it’s important to remember  that lawyers who can’t, won’t or don’t also think  
like human beings are quite likely to harm  themselves,  their clients,  the reputation of 
the bar and the effectiveness of the legal system.   
  
This leads me to a second strategy — inter-disciplinarity — which (as I’ve suggested) 
law schools have been preaching  for decades,  and sometimes actually practice.  Inter-
disciplinarity takes many forms:  joint degree programs,  the cross-appointment of 
scholars from other disciplines to teach law school courses,  so-called “law and…” or 
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“perspective” courses and, most commonly, casebook and classroom references to 
economic, political, sociological,  philosophical and  historical perspectives on legal 
issues.   Interdisciplinary teaching is difficult:  many law professors aren’t well-trained or 
well-read in other disciplines; appropriate materials are sometimes hard to come by; 
students are often resistant.  However,  most legal academics — like the CBA — are 
convinced that inter-disciplinarity is an essential element of the response to change:  it 
shakes lawyers loose from the notion that law is unchanging and unchangeable;  it gets 
them into the habit of thinking outside the legal box;  and it helps them better 
understand just what’s in that box.  Inter-disciplinarity, depending on your point of view, 
is either  a complement or a corrective to thinking like a lawyer.    
  
A third, related strategy long ago  adopted by law schools, but still resisted by the 
profession, is the optional curriculum.   Optionalization is meant to engage students 
intellectually and, at the same time, to help them to prepare  for varied and 
unpredictable  futures.    There’s not much downside to the optional curriculum.  If law 
schools are primarily teaching students how to think, one subject will  serve as well as 
another.  To the contrary:  the optional curriculum has distinct advantages.   Students 
with  different interests and career aspirations will  sensibly want to study subjects that 
seem relevant to those aspirations.  Consequently, optionalization  enhances 
motivation. And there’s yet another advantage:  if graduates are going to  have  to 
educate themselves during their future careers, in order to adapt to a changing society, 
economy and legal system,  they must  learn to learn.  The optional curriculum — if it is 
properly structured and  involves advanced, interdisciplinary and  capstone courses, as 
well as research and writing requirements — ensures  that students will do just that.  In 
particular, it allows them to  develop  integrative skills,  to locate what they’ve learned in 
a larger and more flexible frame that  can absorb new material as it comes their way 
over the years.   And one more point:  the optional curriculum gives scholar-teachers  
an opportunity  to use their classroom or seminar room as  a testing ground for new 
ideas and as a conduit for disseminating those ideas to future generations of 
practitioners and policy makers.   Consequently, it  is an important vehicle for the 




Finally, law schools are increasingly committed to experiential learning.  They believe 
that immersing  students in  real or simulated legal situations has several advantages. 
Like the optional curriculum,  experiential learning enhances motivation. It  exposes  
students to certain  intractable facts of legal life —  the legal power of  deep pockets, for 
example, or the stultifying  effects of  déformation professionelle  — that are difficult to 
convey through conventional  course materials.   And it incites them to think critically 
and systemically as well as analytically.   But I’ll add a note of caution:  there’s a risk 
that  experiential learning can degenerate into mere  skills training.  Obviously, if 
students do learn something about negotiation or counselling or advocacy, that’s a good 
thing.   However, experiential learning  is not  simply to show students how to put “law-
think” to practical use; it is to enable them to confront the  normative, logistical and 
relational issues that are imminent in all legal encounters.  In this sense, the  success of 
experiential learning depends ultimately on the strength of law schools  as knowledge 
communities, on their  ability to provide  students with context and perspective that 
allow them to make sense of what they’ve observed or experienced.   
 
The future of law schools, then, is to embrace  their vocation  as knowledge 
communities, and to embed  their JD and other educational programs  within their larger 
mandate of aggregating, critiquing and disseminating knowledge, in the context of rapid 
and profound changes in  society and in law.   I have identified four strategies that law 
schools have developed  to advance this view of legal education, strategies that are 
consistent with the CBA’s admonition that they should  focus on   “theory…, principles… 
and reasoning” and not on skills training.   To summarize:  law schools should be 
teaching  students to think like lawyers,  to  contextualize and critically evaluate their 
legal experiences, to adapt to change and,  especially,  to learn how to learn.   If law 
schools  don’t do these things, no one will, and  their graduates will be worse lawyers,   
worse citizens and worse people as a result. 
 
Now I have to address a tough question:  if that’s all that law schools do, is it enough?  
If  their  graduates  don’t have legal skills and don’t know substantive law, aren’t they 
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likely to be a risk to their clients, their colleagues and their liability insurers?   I think not.  
There’s good reason to believe  that new graduates  with limited knowledge of 
substantive law and a limited repertoire of  skills can still end up as highly successful 
practitioners.   Let me remind you that  many famous jurists  had very rudimentary  legal 
educations;  that many specialists today never took courses in the fields in which they 
excel;  and that most skilled advocates, draftspersons and negotiators learned their 
trade on the job, not at law school.  In the United States, graduates of  law school  that 
prize scholarship,  schools with  wide-open curricula  that emphasize thinking skills, 
theory and inter-disciplinarity  —  fare well  even in today’s difficult  legal labour market.  
They are far more likely to be hired (and for better jobs) than graduates of the other sort 
of schools, those whose faculty don’t publish and whose curricula  emphasize  “basics” 
and “preparation for practice”.  And the large consulting firms that compete successfully 
with law firms in many key markets tend to hire people with on the basis of  their 
intellectual abilities,  not professional “competencies”.   Nor is any of this surprising:  in  
most labour markets today, sophisticated and adaptable knowledge-workers tend to 
fare  better  than semi-skilled workers with a limited repertoire of skills and know-how  
closely aligned to the current modus operandi  of  particular employers or trades.    
 
Let me carry that last thought forward.   If my original description of the legal profession 
as divided by deep fault lines is anywhere near accurate,  the bar  may one day 
recognize not just one  class of members, but many.   Members of each  class would 
have  different educational credentials, and a limited  license to practice — just as 
Ontario  paralegals and solicitors do today.   I can imagine, for example,  that general 
practitioners will one day be licensed (say)  to appear as advocates  in certain tribunals 
and the lower courts, and to do routine real estate transactions,  simple  incorporations 
and uncontested  divorces  — but not to undertake (say) appellate  litigation, patent 
applications or tax planning.  The classes of membership would likely not be water-tight.  
There would likely be competition, for example, between  paralegals and general 
practitioners in the provision of routine services;  and members of each  class should 
have the chance to  move up the ladder.   If such a system of licensing were adopted,  
the future of law schools  would look quite different from the one I’ve proposed.   They 
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might offer a skills-based one-year degree for paralegals, a  stripped-down two-year 
“basic” degree for general practitioners, an enhanced four  year degree for specialist 
practitioners,  and conversion courses for those who want to upgrade their credentials.    
 
This model has certain attractions: it saves time and money for those who will end up in 
general practice;  it ensures that higher level lawyers possess the  theoretical, analytical 
and  contextual sophistication required to deal with complex and multi-dimensional 
issues;  and it enables law schools and other education providers  to customize their  
curricula  to fit the diverse needs of their students.  These are clear advantages, but 
there are risks as well.   A clear division between faculty members who teach “basics” to 
paralegals and  general practitioners, and those  who teach future legal specialists, 
intellectuals  and policy advisors is likely to engender squabbles  over the soul of law 
schools, or at least over their budgets.  And there are risks for students too: stripping 
the generalist program down to basics might foreshorten  the horizons and stunt the 
ambitions of the students enrolled in it.     
 
But don’t worry about the risks.  It’s not going to happen.  Law schools won’t be 
redesigned to  support a  system of  multiple professional credentials,  because the 
profession will never adopt such a system.   For the foreseeable future,  there will be 
only  one proper professional credential — barrister and solicitor, and only one main 
route to obtaining that credential — via an “approved”  JD degree, one that ticks all the 
boxes specified in  the new law society regulations.  However,  it will be difficult to tick 
those boxes if  law schools  remain true to their character as knowledge communities, if 
they persevere with scholarship, law reform, public advocacy and graduate studies,  
and if they insist on giving JD students a liberal education in law.  Law schools  will 
somehow have to square this circle.  They will either have to challenge  the new  
regulations directly, or feign compliance and hope that no one notices.   If they don’t 
there will be more and more boxes to tick and less and less opportunity to do all the 







The future of law schools is uncertain: all the social, political and intellectual forces  that 
shape legal education are  in flux.   Their  future  is contested:  the academy and the 
profession are fundamentally at odds over the nature of knowledge, the best way to 
educate lawyers and many other matters.  And their future  is plural:  different law 
schools will have different futures.   Nonetheless, I will venture a prediction.  When this 
law school celebrates its bi-centenary in 2113,  when speakers look back on its second 
century of accomplishment,  they will mention distinguished scholarship more often than 
skills training, they will mention its long-term contributions to the public good more often 
than  its immediate influence on present-day legal practice, and they will mention its role 
as an agent of change more often than its role as a faithful purveyor  of conventional 
wisdom.      
  
Taking the long view and focussing on change will, I know, seem like typical academic 
self-indulgence  to those of you  whose job it is to ensure that the public receives high 
quality professional services in the here and now.  Describing law schools as multi-
functional knowledge communities rather than institutions single-mindedly devoted to  
the training of  practice-ready lawyers will seem like a callous indifference to the plight 
of students and recent graduates who face mounting debts and declining job 
opportunities.  And my apparent downgrading  of “hard law” and “how to”  courses and 
my privileging of theory and thinking, of inter-disciplinarity and contextualization,  will  
appal  many of my academic colleagues.  To all of the above I apologize if (as they say) 
I’ve inadvertently given offence.  But I’m willing to bet that when the time capsule is 
opened 100 years hence,  when someone  removes the crumbling copy of my remarks 
and matches them against the historical record,  I’ll turn out to have been right.  And not 
only right but helpful to those charged with upholding professional standards,  prescient 
in my advice as to what kind of education will help  students survive and flourish  in 
volatile  legal labour markets,  and so modest in my prescriptions for reforming the law 
curriculum as to seem hopelessly conservative to my academic heirs and assigns.  
 
